is perfectly compatible with mechanistic materialism.
One would imagine that even a Hogben would be constrained to admit its truth ; for it affirms nothing more than the reciprocal dependence of the parts of the organism which, like those of a machine, make up a distinctive whole. But the likeness between the organism and the machine goes further. The machine has a function which it can fulfil only if all its essential parts co-operate ; and each such part, in thus co-operating, discharges also its function. Here the machine-analogy carries us beyond the point where a resolute mechanist, such as Hogben, can follow: for to recognize a function of the whole or of the part is at once to permit the cloven foot of teleology to enter the mechanists' paradise, or at least is to glimpse its imprint on the desert sand. For function implies purpose and goal, success and failure, adaptation and all the tribe of teleological imps or implications. In the case of the machine the purpose implied by its functioning is that of the men who made it and set it to work. But no man made the organism ; and so although, as I suppose, Hogben recognizes the function and purposive adaptation of the machine and its parts (for even the most extreme mechanists recognize in their unguarded and less rhetorical moments the purposive nature of human activities), he explicitly denies function and adaptation to organisms ; thus accentuating the importance of the organicist revolt against such crudest kind of mechanical biology.

The minimal organicist claim is for the recognition of wholeness in the former of the two senses suggested by the machine-analogy. Many organicists mean no more than this, I think, namely that each organ of the organism has its part to play in the working of the whole organism.